Publicity of debate and the incentive to dissent: evidence from the US federal reserve by Meade, Ellen E. & Stasavage, David
Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: 
Evidence from the US Federal Reserve 
 
Ellen E. Meade and David Stasavage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2004
Abstract 
When central banks are transparent about their decision making, there may be clear benefits in terms of 
credibility, policy effectiveness, and improved democratic accountability.  While recent literature has focused 
on all of these advantages of transparency, in this paper we consider one potential cost:  the possibility that 
publishing detailed records of deliberations will make members of a monetary policy committee more reluctant 
to offer dissenting opinions.  Drawing on the recent literature on expert advisors with “career concerns”, we 
construct a model that compares incentives for members of a monetary policy committee to voice dissent when 
deliberations occur in public, and when they occur in private.  We then test the implications of the model using 
an original dataset based on deliberations of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee, asking 
whether the FOMC’s decision in 1993 to begin releasing full transcripts of its meetings has altered incentives 
for participants to voice dissenting opinions.  We find this to be the case with regard to both opinions on short-
term interest rates and on the “bias” for future policy. 
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1 Introduction
There has been much recent discussion of the advantages of transparency
in monetary policymaking. When central banks decide to publish macro-
economic forecasts, reveal individual votes on monetary policy committees,
or release minutes of meetings, it is commonly argued that these steps will
lead to improved economic outcomes. Transparency makes it easier to judge
whether a central bank is committed to an announced policy, and in related
fashion, transparency can improve the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy to
the extent that financial markets find it easier to interpret policy changes.1
Transparency also has the advantage of facilitating democratic accountabil-
ity. While recent research has attempted to model and empirically evaluate
the benefits of transparency, there has been less eﬀort to systematically ex-
amine whether there might also be disadvantages for monetary policymaking.
This is a critical question because, in the absence of such costs, it might seem
that full transparency should always be the rule. In this paper we focus on
one specific type of transparency, publishing detailed records of central bank
board meetings, and one specific reason why this type of transparency might
not be desirable, the possibility that the quality of deliberation on a cen-
tral bank board will suﬀer if deliberation occurs in public. We develop a
theoretical model that helps identify the potential costs of this type of trans-
parency, and we then empirically test the model using an original dataset
on deliberations of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC). Our empirical tests focus in particular on the observed eﬀect of
the institutional change that occurred in 1993, when the FOMC decided to
begin releasing transcripts of its meetings after a delay of five years.
To investigate the above issue, we first develop a model of deliberation on
a monetary policy committee, where members care both about reaching the
correct decision and about convincing an outside audience that they have a
high level of expertise. We consider a three-member committee that must
decide on a binary action, with the “correct” action depending on the re-
alization of an unobserved state variable. One interpretation would be to
have the binary action be the choice between raising interest rates or hold-
ing them constant, while the state variable could be whether output is at or
above its potential level. Individual committee members receive informa-
1See Faust and Svensson (2001) for a model that demonstrates how credibility depends
upon transparency. Gerlach-Kristen (2003) presents empirical evidence on releasing voting
records of monetary policy committees. See Geraats (2002) for a survey of the literature
on transparency in monetary policy. See also Kohn and Sack (2003), Thornton(2003),
Goodfriend (1986) for an early discussion of the issue, and empirical evidence in Chortar-
eas, Stasavage, and Sterne (2003).
1
tive private signals about the state variable and, as a result, the committee
is more likely to make the correct policy choice when members accurately
reveal this information. In addition, we assume that committee members
are uncertain about the accuracy of their private signal, that they speak in
sequence, and that a committee member who is known to have a high level
of expertise speaks first. As discussed below, these assumptions closely fit
current FOMC practice. We consider how the incentive for committee mem-
bers to truthfully reveal their private signals varies depending on whether the
statements they make during committee deliberations are subsequently re-
vealed to the public. In a previous paper that considers a similar model
and the case of public deliberation, Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) show that
when a committee member who is known to have high expertise speaks first,
then subsequent speakers can face an incentive to mimic the behavior of the
known expert rather than accurately reveal their private information. This
result parallels a number of other papers in the literature on expert advisors
with “career concerns”, which have shown how advisors can face incentives
to withhold private information if accurate revelation would lead principals
to infer that they have a low level of expertise.2 The idea that deliberation
may be hindered by publicity is not a new one. Speaking about the secrecy
rule that prevailed during the US Constitutional Convention of 1787, James
Madison emphasized that full publicity would have made members more re-
luctant to freely express their true opinions, and he saw secrecy as having
been critical to the Convention’s ultimate success.3 As we will discuss below,
similar opinions have been expressed regarding the discussions of the FOMC.
In Section 2 we show that members of a monetary policy committee will
have a greater incentive to truthfully reveal their private information if their
individual statements in committee meetings are not subsequently made pub-
lic. When deliberation occurs in private, incentives of individual committee
members are more closely aligned with those of the committee as a whole,
because outside observers will establish inferences about the expertise of in-
dividual committee members based on the quality of the committee’s policy
decision, rather than on the accuracy of individual statements. Based on this
result, we develop the testable proposition that any committee that switches
from private to public deliberation (provided members care suﬃciently about
their reputations and a known expert speaks first) should be associated with
2See Ottaviani and Sorensen (2003), Levy (2003), and Scharfstein and Stein (1990) for
examples. Prat (2003) is an exception in this literature in considering both a case where
an expert’s recommendation is observed and a case where it is not observed.
3Max Farrand (ed.) The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, New Haven (1911)
Vol III, p.478.
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fewer instances in which committee members express opinions that dissent
from those expressed by the chair. It should be emphasized that because
our model focuses on the specific issue of incentives for oﬃcials to reveal
information, it cannot be used to make a general assessment of when private
deliberation is preferable. Such a calculation would depend upon weighing
the costs of transparency in terms of reduced quality of deliberation against
the observed benefits in terms of increased accountability and increased ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy.
In Sections 3 and 4, we test our proposition about public vs. private
deliberation by considering a natural experiment involving the US central
bank’s policymaking body, the FOMC. Before 1993, the FOMC published
individual votes of committee members as well as summary minutes of meet-
ings, but it did not publish full transcripts that would allow outside observers
to determine exactly what individual committee members said during pro-
ceedings. Under pressure from Congress, in the fall of 1993 the FOMC
agreed to release lightly-edited transcripts of each meeting after a five-year
delay. As discussed in Section 3, while the five-year delay was implemented
to ensure that committee members would continue to express their opinions
freely, some observers at the time thought that even a five-year delay might
not be suﬃcient for this purpose. Our empirical evidence supports this
concern. Fortunately for our purposes, the FOMC decision involved the
publication of lightly-edited transcripts going back to 1976, based on literal
transcriptions made from tape recordings. While many oﬃcials knew that
FOMC meetings were tape-recorded, most thought the recordings were used
to prepare meeting minutes and then the tapes were recorded over. Because
transcripts exist from a time when meeting participants did not know that
their deliberations would be made public, we are able to compare the behav-
ior of committee members before 1993, when committee members believed
that their remarks were private, and after 1993, when they knew that all
statements would eventually be made public. To do this we make use of an
original dataset that records whether individual FOMC members expressed
verbal opposition to the Fed chairman’s policy proposals for both the ap-
propriate level of the short-term rate (the Fed funds rate) and the policy
“bias” or “tilt” that provides an indication of the likely future direction of
policy. It is important to consider these cases of verbal dissent, because
Meade (2002) has previously established that in the majority of instances
where members of the FOMC verbally dissent from the chair’s position, they
do not subsequently dissent from the chair’s position in the oﬃcial vote. As
a result, analyzing only actual votes, and not the statements made during
the committee discussion, can provide a misleading interpretation of FOMC
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debates.
We find clear evidence of a change in the character of FOMC delibera-
tions following the 1993 decision to release full transcripts. Distinguishing
between FOMC members who are Board Governors, those who are voting
Presidents of regional Federal Reserve Banks, and those who are non-voting
Presidents, we find that the two former groups in particular have been sig-
nificantly less likely to express verbal dissents on policy decisions since 1993.
In addition, all three groups have been significantly less likely to dissent
from the chair’s position regarding the “bias” or “tilt” of future policy. The
results remain robust when controlling for a number of other potential deter-
minants of individual committee member positions including macroeconomic
variables and uncertainty among forecasters. They are also robust to con-
trols for individual specific eﬀects. Finally, these results are supported by
a number of parallel observations about the changing character of FOMC
debate since 1993. While before 1993 FOMC discussions were characterized
by frequent “oﬀ the cuﬀ” remarks and interruptions, since 1993 there has
a been an increased tendency for committee members to present the sort
of pre-prepared statements that may result in less real deliberation. These
empirical results have significant implications for the design of monetary pol-
icy institutions, as well as for the operation of committee-based government
decisionmaking more generally. They suggest that while transparency in
policymaking may have many important benefits, attention should also be
given to the possibility that publicity might stifle debate.
In what follows we first present our model of monetary policy deliberation
in public and private settings in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the 1993
debate regarding the advantages and disadvantages of publishing transcripts.
Section 4 presents our data on FOMC deliberations and reviews our empirical
estimates of the likelihood of verbal dissent. Section 5 concludes.
2 Monetary Policy Deliberation
In this section we present a simple model of a three player monetary policy
committee, composed of players A, B, and C that must decide on a binary
action a ∈ {0, 1}. While the assumption that the action is binary is made for
simplicity, it is not unrealistic given that central banks are known to make
interest rate changes in discrete steps. Each committee member receives a
binary signal si about a state of the world ω ∈ {0, 1}, with each state equally
probable. Player A has a known level of expertise, and her signal is accurate
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with probability p with p > 0.5. Players B and C also receive a separate
signal si. With probability λ each of these oﬃcials has the same high level of
expertise as A (they are of type h), and with probability (1− λ) their signal
is uninformative, and they have a low level of expertise (they are of type l).
Players B and C know these priors, but they do not know their own type,
and they do not subsequently learn their own type. The expected accuracy
of the signals of Player B and C is represented by q = pλ + (1 − λ)0.5.4
These assumptions closely follow those adopted in Ottaviani and Sorensen
(2001).
We assume that utility for each player depends on both choosing the best
policy and on an outside observer’s ex post assessment of the player’s level
of expertise. This outside observer could be someone who is considering
whether to reappoint the committee member, or it could be a prospective
employer for the member subsequent to her period of committee service (a
firm, university, or other). More generally, even if members of a monetary
policy committee are not motivated by explicit future career concerns, they
may be motivated by the more simple desire to appear for posterity as some-
one who has made expert predictions about the state of the economy.5 In
this case all of the assumptions, and thus the predictions, of our model re-
main fully applicable. The best policy action a matches the realization of
the state variable ω. The outside observer’s ex post assessment that a player
is of type h is conditional on observing the action chosen by the committee,
the realization of the state ω, and (when these can be observed) the message
mi that an individual sends during committee deliberations and her vote
vi. Following a common assumption in the literature on career concerns, we
assume that each player receives a reputational payoﬀ proportional to the
outside observer’s posterior probability that the player has a high level of
expertise Pr(h|a,mi, vi, ω). In addition, we assume that this reputational
payoﬀ is scaled by the parameter β with β > 0. There are a number of
factors that might aﬀect the value of β, but one in particular is that oﬃ-
cials who have a longer term to serve on the committee before receiving their
reputational payoﬀ would logically discount the present value of this payoﬀ
4We would obtain the same results if we assumed that players of type l had informative
signals, provided these signals are less accurate than are the signals of players of type h.
5It is also possible that members of a monetary policy committee want to present
a "united front" and appear to the public to reach decisions by consensus and without
internal tensions. In this case, making deliberation public may result in less disagreement
among committee members but not due to reputational concerns. We do not model this
desire for consensus, but mention it because it appears to be important for some monetary
policy committees, such as the ECB Governing Council.
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more heavily.6 Utility for each player follows the following state-dependent
function. ½
a+ β Pr(h|a,mi, vi, ω) if ω = 1
(1− a) + β Pr(h|a,mi, vi, ω) if ω = 0 (1)
To the extent that they would like to choose the right policy, players
have an incentive to fully reveal their signals. However, their reputational
concerns can conflict with this incentive for accurate revelation. We will
demonstrate how incentives to reveal information accurately depend on the
outside observer’s ability to monitor an individual’s message and on the pa-
rameter β. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The state of the world ω is realized (but not observed) and private
signals si are realized.
2. Each player sends a message mi with the A speaking first, followed by
Player B, then Player C.
3. Players vote on an action a ∈ {0, 1} in the same sequence as during
the message round.
4. The state of the world ω becomes public, and each player receives a
payoﬀ determined by the action a and the posterior probability that
she has high expertise Pr(h|a,mi, vi, ω).
Given the above assumptions, there will always be an equilibrium where
A reports her signal truthfully and where B and C mimic A’s message, re-
gardless of their private signals. This equilibrium can be sustained, both
under public deliberation and private deliberation, as long as B and C each
anticipate that the other will mimic A.7 In this “uninformative” equilib-
rium, at the voting stage all three players will have a clear incentive to vote
according to A’s message vi = ma. This equilibrium will obviously be in-
eﬃcient, because the private information held by B and C has no eﬀect on
the policy outcome. In what follows, we identify conditions for existence of
an “informative” equilibrium where B always reports her message truthfully
and C reports her message truthfully if it is “pivotal”. A message is “piv-
otal” here if truthful reporting would result in other players changing their
beliefs about which state of the world is more likely.
6One interpretation would be to have β = cδn, where c is a parameter, δ is a discount
factor reflecting the rate of time preference, and n is the number of periods before receiving
the reputational payoﬀ. However, this would also raise the issue of incentives to truthfully
reveal signals in a multi-period game.
7As in any model with costless messages, there will also always exist a "babbling"
equilibrium in which all three players send untruthful messages.
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In the informative equilibrium all players will have an incentive to vote
vi = 1 if two or more players previously sent a message mi = 1, and they
will vote vi = 0 otherwise. The fact that voting, which takes place after
the message round, is unanimous implies that, under our assumptions, it is
irrelevant whether the voting round occurs in private or in public. Given that
all players vote the same way, outside observers cannot use individual votes
to derive information about a player’s level of expertise. What matters
for the outcome is whether the message round takes place in private, in
which case outside observers must base their inferences about players’ levels
of expertise exclusively on the policy outcome a, or whether the message
round instead occurs in public, in which case outside observers can base
their inferences on individual messages. In a richer model that allowed
for diﬀerent preferences over policy between committee members, then it
would be possible to have non-unanimous voting outcomes, as occurs on
actual monetary policy committees like the FOMC. Since voting incentives
are relatively straightforward, we relegate further discussion of them to the
appendix, and in the next two sub-sections we concentrate on showing how
the incentives for B and C to send truthful messages vary depending on
whether deliberation occurs in public or in private.
2.1 Public Deliberation
For playersB and C the condition for existence of the informative equilibrium
involves their incentive to truthfully reveal their signal, even if it diﬀers from
that reported by Player A, who has a known high level of expertise. Consider
first the incentives faced by Player C. If A and B send identical messages,
then C knows that her message will not be pivotal, and she has a clear
incentive to mimic the message sent by A and B regardless of the signal she
receives. The incentives for C are not as straightforward if A and B do not
send the same message. If A and B send diﬀerent messages about the state,
and the signal received by C corresponds to the message reported by B, then
C’s belief about the state will be as follows,
Pr(ma = ω|ma,mb, sc) =
p(1−q)2
p(1−q)+(1−p)q
p(1−q)2
p(1−q)+(1−p)q + (1−
p(1−q)
p(1−q)+(1−p)q )q
(2)
which simplifies to the expression below (we denote this by θ)
Pr(ma = ω|ma,mb, sc) = p(1−q)2p−2pq+q2 = θ (3)
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Under these conditions, if θ < 0.5, meaning C’s message is pivotal, and C
truthfully reports her signal, then her expected payoﬀ is shown in expression
(4).
(1− θ) + β((1− θ) pλpλ+0.5(1−λ) + θ
(1−p)λ
(1−p)λ+0.5(1−λ)) (4)
In expression (4) and the subsequent expressions, the reputational payoﬀ
in the case that C’s message corresponds to the true state is Pr(h|mc =
ω) = pλpλ+0.5(1−λ) . Her payoﬀ in the case where her message turns out to be
incorrect is Pr(h|mc 6= ω) = (1−p)λ(1−p)λ+0.5(1−λ) .8 If Player C falsely reports her
signal, then her expected payoﬀ is shown in (5).
θ + β(θ pλpλ+0.5(1−λ) + (1− θ)
(1−p)λ
(1−p)λ+0.5(1−λ)) (5)
Based on (4) and (5), it is straightforward to observe that if θ < 0.5, then
the expected utility from truthful reporting will be higher than the expected
utility from false reporting. As a result, Player C has an incentive to report
her signal accurately if her message is pivotal (in the sense that it will result
in both A and B believing that the probability that A’s message is accurate
is less than 0.5).
Consider now the incentives faced by Player B. If Player B receives
the same signal as reported by A, then it is straightforward to show that B
has an incentive to truthfully report. The key question is what incentives
face Player B if her signal does not correspond to the message reported
by A. If sb 6= ma then B’s belief that the state is as reported by A is
Pr(ω = ma|ma, sb) = p(1−q)p(1−q)+(1−p)q . If B herds by sending a false message
ma = mb, then she knows that Player C will also send the same message,
and all players will vote vi = ma. As a result, her expected utility from false
reporting is
p(1−q)
p(1−q)+(1−p)q + β((
p(1−q)
p(1−q)+(1−p)q )
pλ
pλ+0.5(1−λ) + (1−
p(1−q)
p(1−q)+(1−p)q )
(1−p)λ
(1−p)λ+0.5(1−λ))
(6)
If B instead reports her signal accurately, then she receives the following
expected utility (provided that θ < 0.5):
q + β((1− p(1−q)p(1−q)+(1−p)q )
pλ
pλ+0.5(1−λ) + (
p(1−q)
p(1−q)+(1−p)q )
(1−p)λ
(1−p)λ+0.5(1−λ)) (7)
8This reputational payoﬀ assumes that the player also pursues the equilibrium voting
strategy as specified above.
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Based on (6) and (7), as long as the following inequality is satisfied, B
will report her signal truthfully.
q − p(1−q)p(1−q)+(1−p)q > β(2
p(1−q)
p(1−q)+(1−p)q − 1)(
pλ
pλ+0.5(1−λ) −
(1−p)λ
(1−p)λ+0.5(1−λ)) (8)
When the expression in (8) is satisfied, Player B will accurately report
her signal, regardless of whether it corresponds to the message sent by A.
This inequality can be satisfied for a plausible range of parameters, but it is
less likely to be satisfied as β → ∞. As mentioned above, one factor that
may lead to a higher value of β is if a player has a relatively short term to
serve on the committee. This provides us with a first proposition (see the
appendix for all proofs).
Proposition 1 When a known expert speaks first, other committee members
will only dissent if their reputational concerns are suﬃciently weak.
2.2 Private Deliberation
In strong contrast to what one observes with public debate, when deliberation
takes place in private, the informative equilibrium always exists, irrespective
of the strength of reputational concerns. If both Player A and Player B
truthfully report their signals, then Player C will continue to have an incen-
tive to truthfully reveal her signal if it is pivotal, as was the case under private
deliberation.9 Player B’s incentives change significantly when deliberation
takes place behind closed doors. As before, we focus on the incentive for
Player B to truthfully report her signal, even if it contradicts the message
sent by Player A. We noted above that when deliberation occurs in public,
Player B faces a trade-oﬀ when sb 6= ma; reporting her signal accurately may
provide higher expected utility in terms of the policy outcome, but it will
provide lower expected utility in terms of reputation. When deliberation
instead occurs in private, if she reports truthfully Player B receives higher
expected utility both in terms of policy as well as in terms of reputation.
This is because her reputational payoﬀ now depends strictly on the policy
outcome a and on the realization of the state variable ω. If Player B truth-
fully reports her signal, her expected payoﬀ is as expressed in (9), provided
9In addition, when her signal is not pivotal, Player C will now be indiﬀerent between
herding and truthful reporting when sending her message, because her reputational payoﬀ
will not depend on her message.
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that the condition θ < 0.5 holds. This ensures that if both B and C receive
a diﬀerent signal from A, the posterior that the state is as declared by A is
less than 0.5. Otherwise, both B and C would always mimic A’s message.
q + β(qPr(h|a = w) + (1− q) Pr(h|a 6= w)) (9)
If Player B falsely reports her signal, then her expected payoﬀ is
p(1−q)
p(1−q)+(1−p)q + β(
p(1−q)
p(1−q)+(1−p)q Pr(h|a = w) + (1− p(1−q)p(1−q)+(1−p)q ) Pr(h|a 6= w))
(10)
Based on the above two expressions and after several algebraic steps
(which are provided in the appendix), we can show that B’s payoﬀ will
always be higher under truthful reporting. When we compare equilibrium
outcomes under public and private deliberation, this then leads us to our
principal proposition for empirical testing.
Proposition 2 When a known expert speaks first and career concerns are
suﬃciently strong, there is a greater likelihood that committee members will
dissent if deliberation occurs in private.
3 Deliberation and the Fed’s FOMC
From time-to-time, the US Federal Reserve has been subjected to pressures
to make its procedures more transparent. One important instance of this
sort commenced in the fall of 1992 when the chairman of the House Banking
Committee,10 Representative Henry Gonzalez, requested that the Fed publish
detailed accounts of discussions by its monetary policymaking committee,
the FOMC, shortly after the conclusion of each meeting.11 Gonzalez’ request
culminated in Federal Reserve testimony before Congress on two occasions
in October 1993, and the FOMC’s subsequent decision in November of that
year to publish lightly-edited transcripts of FOMC meetings after a five-
year delay.12 We briefly summarize the debate over this issue based upon
FOMC transcripts and Congressional records from that period. One topic
that received considerable attention at that time was the eﬀect of transcript
10The oﬃcial name is the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Aﬀairs.
11Specifically, the Federal Reserve Accountability Act of 1993 introduced in January
1993 called for minutes, a transcript, and a videotape to be made available to the public
within 60 days of an FOMC meeting.
12At the time, the FOMC’s decision applied only to meetings from 1976 to 1993. The
active decision to publish lightly-edited transcripts of all meetings going forward was not
taken until January 1995.
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publication on the freedom of debate in policy meetings–the question we
address in this paper.
Gonzalez’ challenge to Fed practices arose in the context of changing atti-
tudes about the rights of government agencies to secrecy. Goodfriend (1986)
argues that after the passage of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in
1966, Federal agencies could no longer “keep documents confidential merely
by arguing that secrecy was in the public interest” (p. 64). In the midst
of the Gonzalez episode, President Clinton’s Justice Department changed its
interpretation of FOIA as it applied to deliberative materials from a pre-
sumption of secrecy to a presumption of disclosure. And, in a legal challenge
to FOMC disclosure policy in the mid-1970s (Merrill v. FOMC), the presid-
ing district court stated in its decision that “if it is necessary for the FOMC
to carry out its monetary policy in secrecy then that determination must be
made by Congress and not this Court” (Goodfriend 1986, p. 67).13
During the fall of 1992, in several letters to Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan
and the Presidents of the Fed’s twelve district banks (who serve in a fixed
rotation on the FOMC), Gonzalez called for the prompt publication of de-
tailed minutes of FOMC meetings. In his request, Gonzalez recalled that the
FOMC had in the past published accounts of its meetings in a heavily-edited
transcript called the Memorandum of Discussion, but that this practice had
been discontinued in the spring of 1976.14 After the first FOMC discussion
of the Gonzalez request, Greenspan responded in writing that:
“The major concern in assessing these proposals is their eﬀect on
the deliberative process–the free flow of information and ideas
essential to policymaking. Members need to feel free to trade
ideas, question assumptions, advance hypotheses, make projec-
tions, speculate on alternative policies and possible outcomes,
and especially to change their views in response to the arguments
of others.”
During October 1993, there was considerable discussion of Gonzalez’
proposed legislation and its implications in the context of testimony by
13A number of issues arose in the context of the Gonzalez legislation and hearings, but
we only address those that bear directly on the hypothesis examined in this paper.
14Publication of these Memoranda was discontinued after the passage of FOIA. A
"precipitating factor" in the decision to discontinue them was the FOMC’s concern that
FOIA could be interpreted to mean that "a considerable portion of the memorandum might
have to be made public with a very short lag" (see Kohn, 1992 Transcripts, November 17
meeting).
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Alan Greenspan (on the 13th) and by six Fed Board members (including
Greenspan) and ten Reserve Bank Presidents (on the 19th). In an FOMC
conference call prior to the testimonies, Edward Boehne, President of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and the only Fed policymaker to have
been part of FOMC deliberations in the 1970s, indicated that at the time
that the Memoranda of Discussion were published, “meetings were much
more formal [with] less give-and-take and there was a tendency for people to
come in with prepared statements, which made it diﬃcult for the subsequent
give-and-take that I think has become a real strength of the Committee (p.
4, 1993 Transcripts, October 5 conference call). Boehne’s comment provides
evidence that in a prior experience with this sort of transparency practice,
the FOMC’s discussion had been noticeably aﬀected, despite a lag of five
years before publication.
In his testimony before the House Banking Committee on October 13,
Greenspan stated that “. . . central banks should be disclosing everything
they can up to the point where the disclosure aﬀects their eﬀectiveness” (p.
27, Hearing, 1993a). In his subsequent testimony, Greenspan elaborated on
his concerns that certain disclosure practices could impede the deliberation
process, saying (p. 10, Hearing, 1993b):
“A considerable amount of free discussion and probing question-
ing by the participants of each other and of key FOMC staﬀmem-
bers takes place. In the wide-ranging debate, new ideas are often
tested, many of which are rejected. . . The prevailing views of
many participants change as evidence and insights emerge. This
process has proven to be a very eﬀective procedure for gaining a
consensus around which a directive to the Open Market Desk can
be crafted. It could not function eﬀectively if participants had
to be concerned that their half-thought-through, but nonetheless
potentially valuable, notions would soon be made public. I fear
in such a situation the public record would be a sterile set of
bland pronouncements scarcely capturing the necessary debates
which are required of monetary policymaking. A tendency would
arise for one-on-one premeeting discussions, with public meetings
merely announcing already agreed-upon positions or for each par-
ticipant to enter the meeting with a final position not subject to
the views of others.”
Between the two Congressional hearings in October 1993, FOMC mem-
bers were informed that the Fed staﬀ had kept raw, unedited transcripts of
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all FOMC discussions since 1976. Until this revelation, Fed oﬃcials thought
that any changes in transparency practices would aﬀect future, but not past,
meetings. Although discussions were tape-recorded, most FOMC oﬃcials
thought that these tapes were used to construct minutes and then recorded
over at the next meeting. What few policymakers knew was that the staﬀ pre-
pared literal transcriptions of the tapes in the process of writing the minutes,
and that these literal transcriptions were on file from 1976. With this reve-
lation, the question was no longer whether to publish transcripts, but when
to publish them, in what form, and after what time lag.
At its meeting in November 1993, the first item on the agenda was FOMC
practices and, in short order, the committee voted to publish lightly-edited
transcripts with a five-year delay in the case of meetings for which literal
transcriptions were available,15 and to defer the question of future prac-
tices pending further consideration by a sub-committee. What is notable
about the transcript of this meeting is a decidedly scripted element to the
discussion–oﬃcial statements appear to have been prepared and read into
the record and, in contrast with earlier meetings, there is much less give-and-
take.
In January 1995, a sub-committee headed by Alan Blinder reviewed the
transcript issue and proposed that the committee agree to continue with the
publication of lightly-edited transcripts after a delay of five years. There
was no clear consensus among policy oﬃcials regarding the eﬀects of known
transcription on the quality of deliberation and debate. The view of the sub-
committee was that the FOMC would have been better served if the tape
had never been running. An extreme view was oﬀered by Reserve Bank
President Hoenig who stated that “the tape has had some chilling eﬀect
on our discussions. I see a lot more people reading their statements.” (p.
20, 1995 Transcripts, January meeting). But, Greenspan’s tone was more
moderate, noting that “there is very little evidence that the quality of our
discussions has been reduced.” (p. 22, 1995 Transcripts, January meeting).
This variation in view suggests that, on the margin, the deliberative process
may have been aﬀected by the publication of the transcripts–the hypothesis
we test in section 4.
15Fed attorneys obtained permission from the US Archivist to destroy the unedited,
literal transcriptions once lightly-edited transcripts were published; other possible options
would not have permitted the destruction of the literal transcriptions.
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4 Test of the Deliberation Hypothesis
4.1 The FOMC Transcript Data
Although the Fed publishes the votes of FOMC members, the transcripts
also provide an interesting source from which to assess agreement and dis-
agreement among policymakers. Our dataset is taken from Meade (2002)
which provides detail on the organization of FOMC meetings, the structure
of discussion, and the construction of the data. In brief, meetings are divided
into two “rounds” of discussion. In the first round oﬃcials present their gen-
eral views on the economy, while in the second round oﬃcials discuss policy
options. The second round culminates in a formal vote. The first policy-
maker to speak in the second round is Alan Greenspan, who generally oﬀers
lengthy remarks on his views and makes a policy recommendation. Other
policymakers follow. At the end of the discussion, a formal vote is taken (with
the chairman casting his vote first). Thus, the model used in this paper fol-
lows the actual structure of FOMC discussions in which a known expert,
Greenspan, speaks first. Although there are only twelve voting members at
any given FOMC meeting, it is typical for all nineteen policy oﬃcials to par-
ticipate in both rounds of the discussion. It is therefore possible to ascertain
whether non-voting participants behave diﬀerently from oﬃcial voters with
respect to the policy proposal.
Blinder et al (2001) noted strong internal pressure for oﬃcial FOMC vot-
ers to agree with Greenspan’s policy proposal, suggesting that oﬃcial votes
over-state the extent of consensus within the committee. The oﬃcial votes
do indeed suggest a strong element of consensus, with dissents during the
Greenspan period averaging just over 6 percent. Interestingly, dissents have
declined markedly since the end of 1993: between August 1987 (Greenspan’s
first FOMC meeting) and the end of 1993, oﬃcial dissents were nearly 9 per-
cent of all votes; since 1994, the dissent rate has been less than 4 percent.
Krause (1994) found evidence that dissent rates have declined as the tenure
of various Fed chairmen rose and attributed this to the rise in the number
of Fed oﬃcials appointed during a chairman’s term. Another possible expla-
nation for the decline in oﬃcial dissents during the Greenspan period is the
hypothesis explored here.
Our dataset codes voiced policy preferences based on the transcripts for
FOMC meetings between 1989 and 1997.16 Because the policy under con-
sideration at each meeting has two dimensions (a level for the Fed funds rate
16We did not use voiced preferences for 1988 owing to restricted availability of several
explanatory variables.
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and a policy “bias” or “tilt”), our dataset contains a policy preference on
two variables, the short-term interest rate and the bias, for each participant
who voiced a view. We focus on the short-term interest rate despite the fact
that the Fed formally targeted borrowed reserves over much of our sample
period (other researchers have done this as well, see Thornton and Wheelock,
2000). The policy bias figured in monetary policy from 1983 through 1999
and provides an indication of the likely direction of future policy moves. Bias
was said to be “symmetric” if the likelihood of future tightening and easing
were equal, and “asymmetric” in a specified direction if future tightening was
more likely than easing or vice versa.
After some experimentation with the dating of a dummy variable to cap-
ture the eﬀects of transcript release on the deliberation process, we decided
to exclude observations for all 1993 meetings (our empirical results are not
sensitive to this decision). It is diﬃcult to determine with any certainty
when meeting participants knew that the literal transcriptions existed and
that their comments would eventually become public. In fact, the dating
of this must range widely, because Greenspan knew about the existence of
the literal transcriptions from late 1992, while some oﬃcials did not find out
until the Gonzalez hearings in October 1993.17 Thus, our empirical analysis
examines the pre-tape period of 1989 through 1992 and the post-tape period
of 1994 to 1997, a total of 56 FOMC meetings. From those 56 meetings, the
transcript dataset contains 924 voiced preferences for the level of the Fed
funds rate and 746 voiced preferences for the policy bias (voiced preferences
are the views expressed by voting and non-voting meeting participants other
than Greenspan and are not the oﬃcial FOMC votes).
The frequency distribution for policymakers’ agreement or disagreement
with Greenspan’s proposed rate and bias over the pre- and post-tape periods
is shown in table 1. We have broken down the identity of policymakers into
Board members (the Governors, excluding Greenspan, who vote at every
FOMC meeting), voting Federal Reserve Bank Presidents (the New York
Bank President and four others), and non-voting Presidents (seven partici-
pate but do not vote). In general, the degree of consensus has risen in the
post-1993 period. With respect to the interest rate proposal, there has been a
much greater increase in consensus for Board members than for voting Bank
Presidents. With respect to the bias proposal, the rise in consensus for the
three groups is very similar. Only the behavior of the non-voting Presidents
with respect to the interest rate reflects greater dissensus after 1993 than
before.
17In a conference call on 15 October 1993, Greenspan and other oﬃcials discussed when
they first became aware of the literal transcriptions (see FOMC Transcripts).
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4.2 Binomial Estimation Results
Next, we used binomial logit estimation to examine the eﬀects of transcript
release on voiced policy preferences. The dependent variable in the regres-
sions was a binomial indicator of agreement (0) or disagreement (1) with the
Greenspan proposal. The explanatory variables were a simple set of indica-
tor, dummy variables, and interaction terms: a linear trend to capture eﬀects
associated with Greenspan’s tenure on the committee (TREND), a dummy
to pick up the eﬀects of known transcription after 1993 (TAPE), a dummy
to detect diﬀerences in behavior between Board members and Bank Presi-
dents (BOARD), a dummy to distinguish between voting Bank Presidents
and other meeting participants (BPVOTER), an interaction of the tape and
Board dummies (TAPE*BOARD), and an interaction of the tape and voting
Bank President dummies (TAPE*BPVOTER). In these initial regressions,
we ignore the influence of macroeconomic data and forecast uncertainty on
the decision to agree or disagree with Greenspan’s policy proposal; in the
next sub-section, we turn to a richer and more complicated formulation that
includes these variables.
Table 2 provides coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors for a standard
logit and a random-eﬀects logit specification. The coeﬃcient on the TAPE
dummy is significant and negative in all equations, indicating that once Fed
policymakers knew that their discussions were being taped, they tended to
voice greater agreement with Greenspan’s proposals. The interaction term
TAPE*BOARD is also negative and significant in the equations for the short-
term interest rate, indicating that the eﬀects of known taping were even more
important for the behavior of Board members.
Table 3 summarizes the marginal eﬀects of the dummies and interaction
terms for each type of FOMC meeting participant. The estimated probabil-
ity of disagreement with Greenspan’s rate and bias proposals drops sharply
after 1993.18 This drop is roughly similar for the three types of participants
with regard to the bias, but varies by group with regard to the interest rate.
After 1993, the probability of dissent from the proposed interest rate is only
2 percent for a Board member and 8 percent for voting Bank Presidents. In-
terestingly, although the probability of dissent falls after 1993 for non-voting
Bank Presidents as well, the estimated probability of dissent for this group re-
mains higher than the estimated probability for the other two groups. These
18The estimated probability for each group before and after 1993 was calculated by
setting the relevant dummy variables equal to 1 or 0, while other variables were set to
their means. So, for example, to calculate the estimated probability of dissent for board
members after 1993 we set TAPE=1, BOARD=1, BPVOTER=0, TAPE*BOARD=1,
TAPE*BPVOTER=0, and TREND equal to its mean.
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results may align with the magnitude of the reputational payoﬀ parameter
discussed above. Over the period studied, the term of a Board member av-
eraged 5.8 years, less than the 12 year average of a Bank President. Thus,
reputational concerns could play more of a role for Board members than for
Bank Presidents, accounting for greater herding behavior and less dissent
among the former than the latter after 1993. Although we do not examine
separately the terms in oﬃce for voting and non-voting Bank Presidents,
it would not be surprising if the reputational concerns of non-voters were
weaker than for participants whose oﬃcial votes are recorded.
Given the lower frequency of disagreement after 1993 on both interest
rate and policy bias decisions, we considered the possibility that the results
presented in Tables 2 and 3 might be influenced by heteroskedasticity, par-
ticularly with respect to the TAPE variable. Standard Lagrange multiplier
tests indicated that our interest rate regressions were not influenced by het-
eroskedasticity but that this particular form of heteroskedasticity might be
present in our bias regressions. Subsequently, we estimated a heteroskedas-
tic probit model for both the interest rate and bias equations; in these het-
eroskedastic probit regressions, the equation’s variance was estimated as a
function of TAPE and TREND. The results were very similar to those
reported in Tables 2 and 3. In addition, estimated probabilities of disagree-
ment remained very similar to those reported in Table 3 when we split our
sample into two time periods and estimated one logit equation using pre-1993
observations and another using post-1993 observations.
4.3 Multinomial Estimation Results
Finally, we used multinomial logit estimation which allows us to judge the
eﬀects of transcript release in a specification that controls for macroeconomic
data and forecast uncertainty. In these regressions, the dependent variable
was an indicator of agreement (0), dissent for tighter policy (1), or dissent
for easier policy (-1) relative to Greenspan’s proposal. The macroeconomic
variables were: the weekly Fed funds rate (FF), the monthly unemployment
rate (UNEMPL), the 1-month change in industrial production (IP), an esti-
mate of the output gap (GAP), and the 1-month change in inflation (CPI);
all variables were lagged one observation relative to the date of an FOMC
meeting. In order to gauge the uncertainty of the economic situation at the
time of the FOMC meeting, we used monthly forecasts for real GDP growth
and inflation at one- and two-year horizons to construct forecast uncertainty
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variables (denoted fGDP1, fGDP2, fCPI1, fCPI2).19 In estimating these
equations, we constrained the coeﬃcients on our non-economic variables to
be equal across the dissent for tighter policy (1) and dissent for easier policy
(-1) categories.20
Table 4 provides results from the multinomial logit estimation. Table 5
gives the estimated probability of disagreement before and after 1993 for each
type of FOMC participant. After controlling for macro data and uncertainty,
the overall likelihood of dissent by each category of participant is somewhat
smaller than the likelihoods given in Table 2. With regard to interest rates,
the probability of dissent (for lower or higher rates) is smaller for Board
members after 1993, is unchanged for voting Bank Presidents, and is higher
for non-voting Bank Presidents. With regard to the bias, the likelihood
of dissent is lower after 1993 for all meeting participants. Thus, the main
result holds in a more complex specification that accounts for macroeconomic
developments and uncertainty, and aﬃrms some eﬀect of known taping on
the deliberation process.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the eﬀects of a specific type of transparency–
the publication of detailed transcripts from monetary policy meetings–on
the quality of a monetary policy committee’s discussion and debate. We first
developed a theoretical model of deliberation on a three-member monetary
policy committee in which a known expert speaks first and all members of the
committee are concerned both about making the correct policy decision and
about having a good reputation in public. We showed that in this model the
likelihood of having an informative equilibrium in which members accurately
reveal private information is greater when deliberation takes place behind
closed doors than when deliberation occurs in public. We then subjected
this model to empirical testing using an original dataset on deliberations of
the Federal Reserve’s FOMC from 1989-1997. The Fed provides a natural
experiment for testing our model because of an institutional change in 1993
after which the FOMC decided to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings
after a delay of five years. During its 1993 debate over whether or not to
change its transparency practices, FOMC oﬃcials discovered that the Fed’s
19Forecast uncertainty for each variable at each forecast horizon was proxied by the
standard deviation from a linear trend. The forecasts for real output growth and inflation
were taken from Consensus Economics.
20In an unconstrained model standard tests suggested we could not reject the null that
the coeﬃcients on the political variables for the (1) and (-1) categories were equal.
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staﬀ had maintained literal transcriptions of FOMC meetings dating back
to 1976. Thus, there are transcripts for FOMC meetings during a period
when monetary policymakers did not know such transcripts existed (before
1993) and for a period when these oﬃcials knew that their deliberations
would eventually be published (after 1993). Using simple binomial logit
regressions and more complicated multinomial specifications that take into
account the direction of dissent and macroeconomic data and uncertainty, we
find that the empirical evidence gives clear support to our hypothesis. Fed
policymakers appear to have responded to the decision to publish meeting
transcripts by voicing less dissent with Greenspan’s policy proposals for the
short-term interest rate and policy bias. Our work provides some theoreti-
cal and quantitative evidence for one downside to transparency, in contrast
to much of the literature that argues for greater openness in policymaking
without considering any potential drawbacks.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Here we demonstrate the conditions for existence of a unique informative
equilibrium, which under public deliberation is less likely to exist when rep-
utational concerns are strong. The first step in this proof is to show that in
the informative equilibrium each player will have an incentive to vote vi = 1
if at least two players report a message of 1, and to vote 0 otherwise. If
the voting round occurs in public, players would not gain in terms of repu-
tation by deviating from this strategy as long as outside observers held the
following, plausible out-of-equilibrium belief (meaning the belief after an ac-
tion that never takes place in equilibrium) about the expertise of a player
who voted evi when the other two players voted vi under public deliberation:
Pr(h|mi,evi) < Pr(h|mi, vi). Likewise, no player would ever gain in terms of
reputation from deviating if both the message round and voting round are
private. Both under public and private deliberation, players would also an-
ticipate that unilateral deviations from the equilibrium voting strategy would
have no eﬀect on the policy outcome. The only alternative voting strategy
profile that could possibly constitute equilibrium behavior in this game would
be for A to vote va = sa, for B to vote vb = sb and for C to vote vc = sc if she
is pivotal and vc = va otherwise.21 This non-unanimous voting profile, which
represents the same set of actions that occurs in our informative equilibrium,
could only occur if during the message round neither B nor C reported their
message truthfully. While it is technically possible for this to occur given
that uninformative messages may always be equilibrium behavior, there is
no obvious reason why this would ever take place unless the message round
occurred in public and the voting round took place in private, a possibility
we have not considered in this paper because this pattern of organization
does not seem to be the case with actual committees (and certainly not the
FOMC).
Moving to incentives in the message round, which have already been
considered in detail in the text, when we substitute into (8) with q = (pλ+
(1 − λ)0.5) we have the following condition for existence of the informative
equilibrium, expressed in terms of the accuracy of the A’s signal, the prior
probability that B and C have a high level of expertise, and the weight placed
21In order for this to be the only other potential equilibrium voting strategy profile we
would need to make the plausible assumption, which is commonly used in this type of
game, that players do not pursue weakly dominated strategies. That is, a player would
not vote for a less preferable option, just because she is not pivotal, and because doing so
would have no eﬀect on her reputation.
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on the reputational payoﬀ.
(pλ+ (1− λ)0.5)− p(1−(pλ+(1−λ)0.5))p(1−(pλ+(1−λ)0.5))+(1−p)(pλ+(1−λ)0.5) (11)
> β(2 p(1−(pλ+(1−λ)0.5))p(1−(pλ+(1−λ)0.5))+(1−p)(pλ+(1−λ)0.5) − 1)(
pλ
pλ+0.5(1−λ) −
(1−p)λ
(1−p)λ+0.5(1−λ))
The alternative possibilities for informative equilibria in pure strategies
under private deliberation can be ruled out as follows. First of all, it could
never be an equilibrium for B to mimic A’s signal and for C to subsequently
report truthfully, because C would know that in the case where her message
contradicted a truthful message sent by A, her belief about the state would
be Pr(ma = ω|ma, sc) = (1−q)p(1−q)p+(1−p)q , which will always be greater than
0.5, given our assumption that q < p. Consequently, Player C would have
an incentive to send the same message as A. Second, it can never be an
equilibrium for B to report truthfully and for C to report truthfully in all
cases (and not only when she is pivotal). If C observes that both A and B
have sent the same message, and sc 6= ma,mb, and Player C believes that
these messages are truthful, then C’s belief that the state is as announced
by A and B will be simply p. Since p > 0.5 by definition, if C accurately
reports her signal she will not change the belief about which state is more
likely, and thus it will not change the final outcome a. As a consequence,
when deciding what message to send, player C will only take into account
the impact on her reputational payoﬀ Pr(h|mc, ω). If after revelation of
the state mc = ω this payoﬀ is Pr(mc=ω|h)λPr(mc=ω|h)λ+Pr(mc=ω|l)(1−λ) =
pλ
pλ+0.5(1−λ) . If
after revelation of the state mc 6= ω this payoﬀ is (1−p)λ(1−p)λ+0.5(1−λ) . Since the
reputational payoﬀ will clearly be higher if the state is guessed accurately,
player C would not have an incentive to report her signal accurately.
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
Proposition 2 is proved by demonstrating that when reputational concerns
are suﬃciently strong, there is a range of parameters for which an informative
equilibrium exists under private deliberation, but this equilibrium does not
exist under public deliberation. Based on the conditions for informative
equilibrium under public deliberation established above, we can draw this
conclusion by showing that the informative equilibrium will always exist when
deliberation occurs in private. The incentives for Player C have already
been considered in the text. Player B will earn higher expected utility from
truthful reporting as long as the following inequality is satisfied (which shows
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expected utility from truthful and false reporting).
q + β(qPr(h|a = w) + (1− q) Pr(h|a 6= w)) >
p(1−q)
p(1−q)+(1−p)q + β(
p(1−q)
p(1−q)+(1−p)q Pr(h|a = w) + (1− p(1−q)p(1−q)+(1−p)q ) Pr(h|a 6= w))
(12)
This expression can be simplified in the following steps.
q − p(1−q)p(1−q)+(1−p)q >
β(( p(1−q)p(1−q)+(1−p)q − q) Pr(h|a = w) + (q − p(1−q)p(1−q)+(1−p)q ) Pr(h|a 6= w)) (13)
1 > β(Pr(h|a 6= w)− Pr(h|a = w)) (14)
The above inequality will always be satisfied as long as
Pr(h|a = w) > Pr(h|a 6= w) (15)
Pr(a=w|h)λ
Pr(a=w|h)λ+Pr(a=w|l)(1−λ) >
Pr(a6=w|h)λ
Pr(a6=w|h)λ+Pr(a6=w|l)(1−λ) (16)
Pr(a = w|h) > Pr(a = w|l) (17)
This inequality will always be satisfied given the specified equilibrium
strategy where B reports truthfully.
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Table 1.  Percent disagreeing with Greenspan policy proposal  
 
 
 Pre-1993 Post-1993 
 
 
 
Short-term Interest Rate 
Voting Board members 11.4 3.1 
Voting Bank Presidents 17.8 13.8 
Non-voting Bank 
Presidents 
14.6 22.9 
  
Policy Bias 
Voting Board members 26.2 10.3 
Voting Bank Presidents 28.4 11.3 
Non-voting Bank 
Presidents 
23.6 9.3 
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Table 2.  Binomial Logit Estimates¹ 
 
Dependent variable: Agreement with Greenspan proposal (0), Dissent (1) 
  
Short-term Interest Rate 
 Logit² SE Logit w/RE SE 
TREND 0.04 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 
TAPE -0.86 (0.48) -1.20 (0.56) 
BOARD -0.30 (0.37) -0.07 (0.55) 
BPVOTER 0.26 (0.33) 0.22 (0.37) 
TAPE*BOARD -1.94 (0.61) -2.27 (0.71) 
TAPE*BPVOTER -0.89 (0.44) -0.66 (0.48) 
No. observations 924 924 
Pseudo R² 0.06 Chi bar²   31.65 
  
Policy Bias 
 Logit² SE Logit w/RE SE 
TREND 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
TAPE -1.02 (0.60) -1.11 (0.59) 
BOARD 0.14 (0.31) 0.19 (0.42) 
BPVOTER 0.25 (0.31) 0.42 (0.34) 
TAPE*BOARD -0.02 (0.50) 0.04 (0.56) 
TAPE*BPVOTER -0.03 (0.51) -0.14 (0.54) 
No. observations 746 746 
Pseudo R² 0.05 Chi bar²   11.61 
 
¹Constants included but not reported. 
²Equations estimated using White standard errors.
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Table 3.  Estimated probability of disagreement with Greenspan policy proposal 
(based on marginal effects from binomial logit regression, standard errors in 
parentheses) 
 
 Pre-1993 Post-1993 
  
Short-term Interest Rate 
  
Prob 
 
SE 
 
Prob 
 
SE 
Voting Board members 0.22 (0.06) 0.02 (0.01) 
Voting Bank Presidents 0.33 (0.07) 0.08 (0.02) 
Non-voting Bank 
Presidents 
0.27 (0.06) 0.14 (0.03) 
  
Policy Bias 
  
Prob 
 
SE 
 
Prob 
 
SE 
Voting Board members 0.25 (0.07) 0.11 (0.04) 
Voting Bank Presidents 0.27 (0.07) 0.12 (0.04) 
Non-voting Bank Pres. 0.23 (0.06) 0.10 (0.03) 
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Table 4.  Multinomial Logit Estimates 
Dependent variable: Dissent for lower (-1), Agreement (0), Dissent for higher (1) 
  
Short-term Interest Rate 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
 Dissent for lower rate (-1) Dissent for higher rate (1) 
TREND¹ 0.06 (0.03) 0.06 (0.03) 
TAPE¹ 0.95 (0.75) 0.95 (0.75) 
BOARD¹ -0.32 (0.37) -0.32 (0.37) 
BPVOTER¹ 0.28 (0.35) 0.28 (0.35) 
TAPE*BOARD¹ -1.95 (0.62) -1.95 (0.62) 
TAPE*BPVOTER¹ -0.92 (0.45) -0.92 (0.45) 
 
FF² 
 
0.61 
 
(0.34) 
 
0.96 
 
(0.32) 
UNEMPL² 3.49 (0.78) 0.70 (0.71) 
IP² -0.95 (0.49) -0.19 (0.23) 
GAP² -0.63 (0.42) -0.04 (0.33) 
CPI² 0.18 (0.15) -0.16 (0.09) 
 
fGDP1 
 
-1.92 
 
(3.39) 
 
-5.60 
 
(2.12) 
fGDP2 0.54 (3.58) -0.20 (2.12) 
fCPI1 -7.16 (2.63) -2.36 (1.86) 
fCPI2 0.87 (3.82) 8.12 (2.73) 
No. observations 924  Pseudo R² 0.18 
  
Policy Bias 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
 Dissent for lower rate (-1) Dissent for higher rate (1) 
TREND¹ -0.08 (0.03) -0.08 (0.03) 
TAPE¹ -1.38 (0.82) -1.38 (0.82) 
BOARD¹ 0.19 (0.32) 0.19 (0.32) 
BPVOTER¹ 0.40 (0.33) 0.40 (0.33) 
TAPE*BOARD¹ -0.01 (0.51) -0.01 (0.51) 
TAPE*BPVOTER¹ -0.13 (0.51) -0.13 (0.51) 
 
FF² 
 
-0.87 
 
(0.39) 
 
-0.33 
 
(0.40) 
UNEMPL² -2.28 (0.84) -0.87 (0.92) 
IP² -0.03 (0.38) 0.72 (0.30) 
GAP² 0.43 (0.33) 0.25 (0.27) 
CPI² 0.07 (0.18) 0.03 (0.08) 
 
fGDP1 
 
4.25 
 
(3.69) 
 
-0.14 
 
(2.48) 
fGDP2 0.25 (2.29) -4.41 (2.37) 
fCPI1 -0.04 (4.50) -1.03 (2.19) 
fCPI2 -16.09 (7.30) -5.15 (2.85) 
No. observations 746  Pseudo R² 0.11 
Equations estimated using White standard errors.  Constants included but not reported. 
¹Coefficients constrained to be equal across categories.  ²Variables lagged one observation relative 
to date of meeting. 
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Table 5.  Estimated probability of disagreement with Greenspan policy proposal 
(based on marginal effects from multinomial logit regression, standard errors in 
parentheses) 
 
 Short-term Interest Rate 
  
Dissent for lower rate 
 Pre-1993 Post-1993 
 Prob SE Prob SE 
Voting Board members 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
Voting Bank Presidents 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
Non-voting Bank 
Presidents 
0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
  
Dissent for higher rate 
 Pre-1993 Post-1993 
 Prob SE Prob SE 
Voting Board members 0.04 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 
Voting Bank Presidents 0.07 (0.03) 0.07 (0.00) 
Non-voting Bank 
Presidents 
0.06 (0.03) 0.13 (0.04) 
 
 
 Policy Bias 
  
Dissent for lower rate 
 Pre-1993 Post-1993 
 Prob SE Prob SE 
Voting Board members 0.07 (0.03) 0.02 (0.01) 
Voting Bank Presidents 0.08 (0.03) 0.02 (0.01) 
Non-voting Bank 
Presidents 
0.06 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 
  
Dissent for higher rate 
 Pre-1993 Post-1993 
 Prob SE Prob SE 
Voting Board members 0.18 (0.08) 0.05 (0.02) 
Voting Bank Presidents 0.21 (0.09) 0.06 (0.02) 
Non-voting Bank 
Presidents 
0.15 (0.07) 0.05 (0.02) 
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